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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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The Transformation of the 
International Political Economy*
The end of the 1980s was a time in human history when one age was re­
ceding and another was rapidly coming into existence.Whether or not one 
agrees with the American publisher Henry Luce that the twentieth century 
was the American century, the Pax Americana and American preemi­
nence were waning. Contrary to the bold predictions of Nikita Krushchev 
and other earlier Soviet leaders, the future does not belong to commu­
nism, communism is not burying capitalism, but is itself on the defensive. 
The United States and the Soviet Union will continue to play crucial roles 
in the emergent global political and economic system. Other nations and 
new forces, however, will become more and more important in giving 
shape and substance to the international political economy.
The historical transformation of the early 1990s, which we are witness­
ing, involves much more than the ending of the reign of the superpowers 
and the primacy of their conflict in the agenda of world affairs. It is not 
merely, as many put it, that the Cold War is over, at least in the form that 
it has assumed in previous decades. What is occurring was characterized 
very effectively by the great British political geographer Halford Mac- 
Kinder in an essay written in 1904. While MacKinder was premature in 
pronouncing the end of the Columbian epoch of the primacy of European 
over other civilizations, his words have become even more salient with 
the passage of time. Because of their prophetic nature I would like to 
paraphrase them:
“When historians in the remote future come to look back on the group 
of centuries through which we are now passing, and see them foreshort­
ened, as we today see the Egyptian dynasties, it may well be that they will 
describe the last 400 years as tire Columbian epoch, and will say that it 
ended soon after the year 1890. Of late it has been common-place to speak 
of geographical exploration as nearly over, and it is recognized that geog­
raphy must be diverted to the purpose of intensive survey and philosophic 
synthesis. In 400 years the outline of the map of the world has been com­
pleted with approximate accuracy, and even in the polar regions the voy­
* The research for this paper was supported by a grant from the Pew Charitable Trusts to 



























































































ages of Nansen and Scott have very narrowly reduced the last possibility 
of dramatic discoveries. But the opening of the twentieth century is ap­
propriate as the end of a great historic epoch, not merely on account of 
this achievement, great though it be. The missionary, the conqueror, the 
farmer, the miner, and, of late, the engineer, have followed so closely in 
the traveller’s footsteps that the world, in its remoter borders, has hardly 
been revealed before we must chronicle its virtually complete political 
appropriation. In Europe, North America, South America, Africa, and 
Australasia there is scarcely a region left for the pegging out of a claim of 
ownership, unless as the result of a war between civilized or half-civilized 
powers. Even in Asia we are probably witnessing the last moves of the 
game first played by the horsemen of Yermak the Cossack and the sailors 
of Vasco da Gama. Broadly speaking, we may contrast the Columbian 
epoch with the age which preceded it, by describing its essential charac­
teristic as the expansion of Europe against almost negligible resistances, 
whereas medieval Christendom was pent into a narrow region and threat­
ened by external barbarism. From the present time forth, in the post- 
Columbian age, we shall again have to deal with a closed political system, 
and one of world-wide scope. Every explosion of social sources, instead 
of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and bar­
baric chaos, will be sharply re-echoed from the far side of the globe, and 
weak elements in the political and economic organism of the world will 
be shattered in consequence. There is a vast difference of effect in the fall 
of a shell into an earthwork and its fall amid the closed spaces and rigid 
structures of a great building or ship. Probably some half-consciousness 
of this fact is at last diverting much of the attention of statesmen in all 
parts of the world form territorial expansion to the struggle for relative 
efficiency,l
Several elements of MacKinder’s statement are worth noting. The first, 
of course, is that at the very height of Western domination and imperial­
ism, he foresaw the end of preeminence of Western civilization over the 
World’s other civilizations; although the primacy of western civilization 
continued longer than he expected because of two offshoots of Western 
civilization, the United States and the Soviet Union, Western domination 
is now rapidly receding. Second, the globe is becoming a unified and 
closed system in which “the explosion of social forces”, including, of 
course, that most destructive of social forces, war, reverberate around the 
world. The advent of weapons of mass destruction and the problem of 
environmental degradation have reinforced these destructive forces. And, 
third, the growing awareness of these social, political, and technological 
forces is causing a profound shift in the policies of states from the pursuit 
of territorial expansion to “the struggle for relative efficiency”. To put it 
in the language of another prophetic thinker, Karl von Clausewitz, inter-
1 Halford MacKinder. “The Geographic Pivot of History”, 1904. Reprinted in 




























































































national economic competition has, at least to some extent, become the 
pursuit of foreign policy by other means. Three aspects of the world 
forecast by MacKinder — the end of Western preeminence, the useless­
ness of total war, and the increasing role of international economic com­
petition — define better than anything else of which I am aware the pre­
dominant features of the emergent world economic and political system.
Behind the historic transformation from the Columbian epoch to the 
contemporary civilization lie the forces of economic growth, scientific 
discovery, and technological advance. These forces are the manifestations 
of a process of development and modernization that began in Western Eu­
rope and propelled that small promontory on the eastern edge of the 
Eurasian land mass to global superiority in the first centuries of the 
Columbian epoch. But the Western-centric view, shared by Americans 
and Russians alike, that the transformed world economy will be merely an 
extension and fulfillment of a process of economic growth and technolog­
ical advance that originated in the west and diffused to the rest of the 
world, is a misleading one. To be sure, the Industrial Revolution of the 
18th century, modem science, and the major technologies of the contem­
porary world originated in the West. However, western scholarship is 
beginning to recognize that this notion of a creative West and a passive 
East is incorrect.
The contemporary world is best described as the product of a dual pro­
cess of economic growth and technological development. Although a 
number of civilizations throughout history have experienced periods of 
rapid economic growth, only two civilizations have enjoyed economic 
growth for a long period, and in the twentieth century these two indepen­
dent and autonomous centers of economic growth have become increas­
ingly interdependent. As the integration of these centers of economic 
growth takes place, a truly global economy is coming into existence for 
the first time in human history.
One of these centers arose in Western europe. For most of the modem 
era, it has been the predominant center. Until quite recently, the history 
of the modem world can be understood as a process of historical change 
that began in the Mediterranean and subsequently diffused north to At­
lantic seaboard states before spreading both westward across the Atlantic 
and eastward across the Eurasian continent. These forces of change swept 
across both the North American continent and what MacKinder called the 
“heartland of the Eurasian continent” in Eastern Europe and European 
Russia, but the core of this economic system lay in the North Atlantic 
seaboard economies of Western Europe and North America.
The other of these autonomous centers of economic growth arose in 
Japan. Much younger than the first, it can be said to have begun its period 
of rapid ascent in the early nineteenth century. With the Meiji Restoration 
(1868), this growth process accelerated within Japan itself and then began 
a slow process of diffusion throughout northeast Asia. Today, primarily 




























































































growth process has intensified in northeast Asia and is spreading south­
ward along the east Asian seaboard, into southeast Asia, and across the 
pacific.
Throughout the history of international relations, economic, technolog­
ical, and demographic developments have caused the center of economic 
and political activities to shift from one locus to another. In his massive 
multi-volume history of this historic movement of the global political 
economy, the French historian Fernand Braudel has told the Western half 
of this story graphically in terms of the rise and decline of great and 
dominant urban centers. As one national city has replaced another, the 
shifts in the international distribution of power and wealth “interrupt the 
calm flow of history ... [These shifts] always meant a massive historical 
shift of forces, revealing the precariousness of the previous equilibrium 
and the strengths of the one which was replacing it. The whole ... world 
economy was affected ... and the repercussions were never exclusively 
economic ...”2
Today, the “precarious equilibrium” of the international system is once 
again being upset as historic movements of economic, political, and tech­
nological forces converge on East Asia and Japan. The ongoing shift in 
the international distribution of economic power toward this new center 
of independent and autonomous growth has placed the older and formerly 
dominant centers in Western Europe and North America on the defensive. 
The “calm flow of history” is being disrupted once again, at least for most 
West Europeans and North Americans who have enjoyed in the postwar 
era both unprecedented prosperity and, with the exceptions of the Korean 
and Vietnam Wars, what the American historian John Lewis Gaddis has 
rightly called “the long peace”.3
Beginning in the mid-1980’s, the postwar international system began to 
change with a rapidity seldom known in human history. The spectacular 
rise of Japan and of other economic competitors in east Asia and else­
where in the so-called Third World began to transform the world econ­
omy. The repercussions of the shift in the global division of labor are not 
exclusively economic, but spill over into the realms of political and cul­
tural affairs. China, which only began to industrialize earlier in the 20th 
century, has become by 1990 a major regional military power armed with 
nuclear weapons; one day it could become a global rival to the superpow­
ers. Because of its large economy, Japan’s expenditure of only a little 
more than one percent of its gross national product on national defence 
has moved it to third place in funding of the military after the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The economic, technological, and demo-
2 Fernand Braudel. The Perspective o f the World— Civilization and Capitalism. 15th- 
18th Century, Vol. 3, New York: Harper and Row, 1979, p. 32.
3 John Lewis Gaddis. The long Peace: Inquiries into the History o f the Cold War, New 




























































































graphic forces at work in East Asia and throughout the Pacific rim have 
unleashed a profound and far-reaching process of political change.
The emergent global economy will be primarily the product of the 
coming together and interaction of the Western and east Asian cultural 
traditions, and of their centers of economic growth. In time, other great 
civilizations such as those of China, India, and the Middle East will be in­
tegrated and will assume an increasingly important role as they equip 
themselves to join in “the struggle for relative efficiency”. When they do, 
a truly multipolar world of diverse civilizations will further transform 
human affairs. But, for the immediate future and barring a great war, the 
shape and substance of the international political economy will be pri­
marily a consequence of the interaction among the presently dominant 
world centers of economic growth and technological advance in Western 
Europe, North America, and Northeast Asia.
The task before us is to understand and prepare for the post-Columbian 
age of a truly global economy and political system. Many questions and 
issues confront us. What will be the nature of this international political 
order or, as some pessimists fear, international disorder? While one hopes 
that there will be a truly effective United Nations in which the several 
centers of world power cooperate to keep the peace and promote justice, 
the type of the inter-civilizational conflict that has characterized so much 
of human history cannot be ruled out. What will be the principal ideas or 
ideologies that guide human actions? While Marxism as an economic, 
political, and social system has failed disastrously, it is still too early to 
conclude that Western-style capitalism and democracy will provide the 
model for the future. How shall we organize and manage the truly global 
and transnational economy that is replacing an international economy 
hitherto fragmented by national and other boundaries? While the process 
of economic globalization and liberalization is rapidly integrating national 
economies into a highly interdependent world economy, opposing forces 
of economic protectionism and economic regionalism are also important 
in reshaping global economic affairs. Reformed institutions, new rules, 
and international cooperation are required to guide these economic trans­
formations.
In the rest of this monograph, I want to focus on these economic issues. 
There is an immediate need for action in this area because the economic 
order put into place at the end of the Second World War is disappearing 
and we have thus far failed to put anything substantial in its place. It is in 
the interest of us all to work out the rules for what MacKinder called “the 
struggle for relative efficiency.” We must begin this task by understand­
ing the nature of the contemporary international economic order and the 




























































































The Postwar Bretton Woods System
As Susan Strange has wisely observed in her several critiques of what she 
calls the “American school of international political economy”, one should 
not idealize the postwar Bretton Woods System and the beneficial role of 
American leadership. 4 This international economic system was flawed in 
numerous ways; it was not a Golden Age. American commercial and 
monetary policies, especially after 1970, frequently had a negative impact 
and greatly undermined the effectiveness of the system. Japan and West­
ern Europe also pursued policies based on narrowly conceived notions of 
their economic and political interests. Yet, until the system began its 
steady demise in the mid-1970’s, it did provide a set of rules and institu­
tions that tended to depoliticize and stabilize international economic 
affairs.
The so-called Bretton Woods system had several distinctive features. 
The first was the crucial role and position of the United States in the 
functioning of the system. Beginning at the 1944 Bretton Woods confer­
ence itself, the United States exercised leadership in the construction and 
management of the system. The United States, in cooperation with Great 
Britain, essentially laid down the rules that would govern international 
/  economic affairs. These rules, with several important exceptions, re- 
/ fleeted the American commitment to a liberal economic order based on 
I multilateralism, the Most Favored Nation Principle, and non-discrimina­
tion. These basic precepts were embodied in international institutions 
' created to govern the system, such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). More­
over, the American economy became the principal engine of economic 
growth and created a substantial fraction of the demand for the exports of 
the rest of the world. The United States was in fact rather indifferent to 
its own trade and payments balances; a complementary relationship was 
established in which foreign nations exported to the American market and 
American multinational firms reached foreign markets through overseas 
production by their subsidiaries.
Throughout most of this post-war era, the multinational corporation 
was essentially an American phenomenon. Through foreign direct 
investment,these firms in effect replicated abroad their domestic indus­
trial structures. This so-called “horizontal” type of foreign investment 
created overseas subsidiaries that were not intimately linked to the home 
productive base of the firm. Despite their label as “multinational” or 
“transnational” corporations, these American firms did not greatly ad­
vance the integration and globalization of industrial production.





























































































The dollar became the basis of the international monetary system of 
fixed exchange rates. The United States was the world’s leading financial 
power and creditor nation, supplying the capital necessary for the revival 
and expansion of the world economy. The United States took the lead in 
successive trade negotiations within the framework of GATT. The Dillon, 
Kennedy, and Tokyo Rounds greatly reduced the level of formal barriers 
to international trade in commodities and manufactured goods. These ne­
gotiations, it should be noted, did not cover services, agriculture, foreign 
investment or a number of other subjects of increasing importance.
Underlying the functioning of this system and the expansion of trade 
was the assumption that comparative advantage and trading patterns were 
products of nature and natural endowments. The factors of production 
were assumed to be “given” and immobile. International competitiveness 
and the global division of labor, it was believed, could not be substantially 
altered by the policies of governments. The task of trade liberalization, 
therefore, was primarily a matter of removing external, formal barriers 
to trade and letting market forces determine who produces what and 
where it will be produced. The market reigned.
Another important feature of this system was that financial flows, with 
the exception of the Marshall Plan and of American Aid to Japan, were 
not especially important. Many nations, in fact, controlled capital flows 
and closely regulated their financial markets. Technological factors were 
also a deterrent to the international movement of money and investment 
capital. The system was free from the massive international flows of 
money and finance that had been a destabilizing factor in the 1930’s. The 
major source of concern for economists and political leaders was that of 
recession. The capitalist world was determined to avoid a repetition of the 
Great Depression with its devastating effects on domestic and interna­
tional affairs. At the conclusion of World War Two, almost every capital­
ist country committed itself to pursue policies of full employment, a 
commitment expressed in the triumph of Keynesian economics in the 
United States and elsewhere. With this new science of macroeconomics, 
economists, we were told, could now “fine tune” the economy. The busi­
ness cycle, recession, and inflation were no longer problems of serious 
concern.
This post-war international economy was essentially an Atlantic-cen­
tered and governed economy. The major locus of economic growth lay in 
the North Atlantic basin and the principal economic ties were trans-At­
lantic. American leaders even worried about how the over-populated and 
resource-poor Japanese archipelago could possibly survive. It is worth 
noting in this connection that the sub-title of Richard Cooper’s very influ­
ential book, The Economics o f Interdependence, published as recently as 
1968, was “Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community”.5 How rapidly 





























































































Although Cooper spoke of the world economy as an interdependent 
one, it is important to appreciate that until the mid-1970s, the extent of 
interdependence among national economies was not really very great. As 
I mentioned earlier, for example, industrial production was hardly inter­
nationalized and international financial flows were modest. Economists, 
public officials, and business people could and did think of the world as a 
collection of relatively independent black boxes connected by fixed ex­
change rates, obeying a set of simple rules restricting or proscribing cer­
tain types of economic behavior, and of domestic economic policy isolated 
from the international economy. The rules governing this system were 
simple ones essentially stating what governments could or should not do, 
i.e., they should not erect formal trade barriers in violation of GATT 
rules. Domestic economic policy generally lay outside the scope of inter­
national rules.
The industries and technologies of the second industrial revolution of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (such as steel and the 
internal combustion engine) provided the foundations of this international 
economy. These heavy industries were energy-intensive and based on 
mass production. The industrial system associated with these technologies 
and productive methods has been appropriately called Fordism after 
Henry Ford, the innovator of standardized mass production techniques. 
Throughout the early postwar years the United States was the leader in 
product innovation and production methods, and the Soviet Union under 
Stalin’s ruthless leadership and drive was the second most powerful econ­
omy with its system of centralized planning and massive investments in 
heavy industry.
One final point needs to be made in surveying the main features of the 
postwar international economy. Despite the economic power of the Soviet 
Union, the international economy was essentially a western-based system 
composed of the United States and its European and Japanese political and 
military allies. In contrast to the world economy of the nineteenth century 
it was not an universal system because the Soviet Union and the rest of the 
socialist bloc were in effect outside the system and playing according to 
different rules. In fact, difficult economic issues dividing the three centers 
of world capitalism could frequently be resolved through appeals to the 
need for unity against the common Soviet enemy.
The Decline of the Bretton Woods System
Every one of these features of the post-war Bretton Woods system has 
changed or is changing dramatically. At the opening of the final decade of 
the 20th century, the world economy is being transformed at an astonish- 5
5 Richard Cooper. The Economics of Inderdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic 





























































































ing pace. Whether this emerging global economy will ultimately survive 
continues to be problematic. Renovated international institutions, new 
rules, and increased cooperation among the United States, Western Eu­
rope, and Japan will be necessary if the challenges to the emerging global 
economy are to be surmounted. Our task at the moment, however, is to 
understand the changes taking place in the contemporary international 
economy and the challenges that these fundamental changes pose.
The first major change is the massive redistribution of world economic 
power away from the United States and the Atlantic economies toward 
Japan and the Pacific. The consequences of this redistribution of power 
are profound. It means, for example, that the United States is less and less 
able to perform the role of the engine of growth for other economies. It 
must be increasingly concerned about its trade and payments deficit; it 
must export if it is to arrest its relative decline and, I should add, repay 
its vast accumulated foreign debt. However, the challenge that I would 
like to stress the most is the need for greater international cooperation to 
exercise leadership in monetary, trade, and other economic policies. The 
United States is no longer able to provide this leadership, and interna­
tional economic leadership, such as it is, has passed to the so-called G-7 
nations. In international monetary affairs, a G-2 composed of Japan and 
the United States has emerged to play a vital role in governing the world 
monetary system. Japanese funding of the huge American government 
deficit and the cooperation of these two economies have become central 
features of the contemporary international economy. * Over the long 
term, however, all major powers in the world economy will have to work 
out a more systematic way to coordinate their economic policies and to 
lead the rest of the world.
While the dollar continues to be the basis of the international monetary 
and financial system, its role has been considerably lessened as the Yen 
and the Deutschmark have increased in importance. Japan has become the 
world’s foremost creditor nation and thus far has chosen to use its surplus 
capital to support the weakened dollar. The West Europeans , concerned 
over the instabilities of the dollar and the fluctuations of American policy, 
have formed the European Monetary Union to protect themselves from 
the erratic American economy and are taking steps to create a tighter 
monetary and financial union. The breakdown of the system of fixed ex­
change rates has removed the discipline of the Bretton Woods system. As 
a consequence, the phenomenon of global inflation has become a novel 
feature of the world economy. The fear of uncontrolled inflation has 
placed a severe constraint on economic policy-making and undermined 
confidence in economists and Keynesian economics.
The task of continuing trade liberalization has become increasingly dif­
ficult. Formal tariff barriers have indeed fallen due to the succession of 
multilateral GATT negotiations, but they have ben replaced by bilateral 
arrangements and informal barriers such as so-called Voluntary Export 




























































































as agriculture, services, and foreign direct investment (left out of earlier 
GATT negotiations) have now moved to center stage in the Uruguay 
Round of GATT negotiations. These factors along with the increase in the 
number of participants to over one hundred greatly complicate these 
negotiations.
The international financial system has also been revolutionized by re­
cent developments: the deregulation of domestic financial systems, the in­
creased velocity of international financial flows due to modem telecom­
munications, and a great expansion in the size of these financial flows. 
International financial flows now dwarf trade flows and have become the 
principal determinant of exchange rates, at least in the short run. The size 
and velocity of these financial and monetary flows also have reduced the 
autonomy of domestic economic policy and introduced a new element of 
instability into the system.
Yet another development is the globalization or internationalization of 
industrial production. The multinational corporation is no longer primar­
ily an American phenomenon but is becoming a more tmly transnational 
actor. While Americans firms continue to lead in foreign direct invest­
ment, they have been joined by Japanese and European corporations and 
even by corporations from the developing world . As observed by 
Kenichi Ohmae, these firms realize that they must invest in and establish 
productive facilities in all three cores of the world economy if they are to 
be competitive.6 However, in contrast to the earlier horizontal investment 
strategy of Americans firms, corporations today are increasingly follow­
ing a transnational strategy of “vertical” investment in which production 
processes around the world are integrated and rationalized. Components 
produced in one location may be assembled in a second and sold in a 
third. This globalization of industrial production will gain in importance 
and momentum, especially as regional trading blocs in North America 
and Western Europe gain significance.
The technological environment is also undergoing a profound trans­
formation. In fact, it would be no exaggeration to suggest that mankind 
has entered upon a new or third phase of the industrial revolution. 
Whereas the first phase in the eighteenth century was based on the tech­
nologies of iron and steam power and the second in the late nineteenth 
century on steel, chemicals, and electricity, this new phase represents a 
shift from chemical and mechanical based industries to knowledge-inten­
sive industries. The assembly line and specialized, single purpose equip­
ment of the mass production era are rapidly being displaced by flexible 
and radically new methods of manufacturing. Service industries based 
upon the production and processing of knowledge are becoming of in­
creasing importance. Revolutionary technologies in bioengineering, elec­
tronics, and materials are creating new products and production tech­
6 Kenichi Ohmae. Triad Power: The Coming Shape o f Global Competition, New York: 




























































































niques. Fordism and the technologies on which the advanced economies of 
East and West have been based are becoming less important as sources of 
economic growth and international competitiveness.
As comparative advantage in these industries shifts to the developing 
countries, the more advanced economies, with Japan taking the lead in one 
industry after another, are restructuring their economies around the com­
puter and other high tech industries of the third industrial revolution. 
Fordism is giving way to the flexible production methods pioneered in 
Japan. And modem telecommunications are linking the service and the 
manufacturing industries of the world into a highly integrated global 
economy.
The most important innovation behind this technological innovation is, 
of course, the computer. Its capacity to store and manipulate vast quanti­
ties of data is changing the organisation of work. More importantly, the 
computer has opened up large new areas, previously inaccessible, for sci­
entific research. This last development in turn has reduced the lead-time 
between scientific discoveries and their technological exploitation. The 
fundamental nature of the new knowledge and the rapidity with which it 
can be exploited have greatly intensified its impact on economic affairs, 
military weaponry, and all aspects of contemporary society.
The scope and novelty of many new areas of scientific and technologi­
cal endeavor such as superconductivity, artificial intelligence, and bio­
engineering are stimulating intense international competition. At stake is 
the determination of which nations or nations will be the dominant indus­
trial and technological powers in the decades ahead. While the race has 
just begun and it is obviously much to soon to predict winners or losers, it 
is highly doubtful that there will be an overwhelmingly predominant tech­
nological leader as Great Britain was in the first and the United states was 
in the second industrial revolution.7 While Japan will surely be the leader 
in many, if not most, of these “information based” technologies, leader­
ship in various scientific and technological fields will be shared and 
spread across a broad front. The scope and magnitude of this technologi­
cal revolution are simply too immense to expect one civilization to pre­
dominate in all aspects of scientific and technological knowledge. The ef­
fect of this diffusion of technological entrepreneurship will be to encour­
age technological trading and corporate alliances within and across na­
tional boundaries. The losers in this game will be those corporations and 
nations that have little technology to share and decide to withdraw from 
the competition.
The advent of the information economy and the increasing importance 
of high-tech industries have undennined the basic assumption of the 
Bretton Woods trading system that comparative advantage was a “given” 
of nature and could not be altered by the policies of corporations and/or
7 This is the argument of Angus Maddison in his Phases o f Capitalist Development, New 




























































































governments. Exemplified by Japan’s spectacular rise as a trading nation, 
comparative advantage, at least in manufacturing and services, is now 
recognized as most frequently a product of deliberate policy choices and 
such factors as learning by doing, investment in education, research and 
development, and economies of scale. The fact that comparative advantage 
can, at least to some extent, be created, has encouraged governments to 
intervene in the market and to pursue industrial policies. Recent develop­
ments in the theory of international trade, in fact, give intellectual support 
to the argument that nations should not leave trading patterns and the lo­
cation of global industry to the market alone.8 It should be emphasized, 
however, that industrial policies are often wasteful and poorly conceived. 
In addition, while comparative advantage has become more arbitrary and 
mutable, this fact does not lead to the conclusion that it does not exist. The 
case for a territorial division of labor based on comparative costs is still a 
strong one. Consequently, nations will participate in the world economy 
at the same time that they attempt to influence economic forces to their 
own national advantage. This paradoxical situation accounts in part for 
certain contradictory developments within the international political 
economy.
These several developments in economics, politics, and technology are 
transforming profoundly the nature of the international economy and 
therefore the problems posed for governments. A truly global and 
transnational economy is replacing the postwar international economy 
composed of isolated black box economies, connected mainly by the ex­
change rates and governed by a simple set of mles. The extent of interde­
pendence in trade, finance, and production has deepened more than most 
societies and political leaders appear to appreciate. National economies 
have become so intertwined since the mid-1970s that domestic economic 
policies are losing their effectiveness and governments have much less ca­
pacity to pursue autonomous and independent policies. Also, in a more 
integrated world economy, seemingly domestic actions and policies of one 
nation will necessarily impinge upon the interests and policies of other 
countries. In a highly interdependent world, what in the past was consid­
ered to be a domestic matter can become an international one. For exam­
ple, some of the more serious obstacles to international commerce today 
are domestic policies and economic institutions such as the West European 
agricultural program and the American banking system. Yet, the rules 
and institutions governing this highly integrated transnational economy 
continue to be essentially the ones laid down at the 1944 Bretton Woods 
conference.
8 Paul Krugman, ed. Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economic Order, 




























































































The Transformation of the International 
Political Economy
As a consequence of the many changes that I have discussed, the interna­
tional economy is undergoing an historic transformation. I use the term 
- “international political economy” rather than “international economy” be­
cause the transformation taking place is as much political as it is eco­
nomic. The shift from the Bretton Woods international economy to a 
global transnational and highly interdependent economy signifies a major 
development in the evolution of international economic and political rela­
tions. It is, however, still an ambiguous development permitting different 
interpretations and presenting difficult problems to be resolved.
The integration of national economies into a transnational economy is 
taking place at an astonishing rate in the areas of trade, finance, and pro­
duction. Replacing a world economy composed of relatively isolated na­
tional markets, today there is a world market serviced by international as 
well as by domestic corporations in many economics sectors. Deregula­
tion and technological developments have integrated financial markets 
into a truly global system. The multinational corporation is becoming the 
principal mechanism for the allocation of investment capital and determi­
nation of the location of production throughout much of the world. West­
ern Europe has re-initiated the process of the unification and, with the 
crumbling of the Soviet empire, die postwar division between Eastern and 
Western Europe is rapidly disappearing. The North Atlantic-centered 
world economy of recent centuries is rapidly being displaced by a truly 
global economy in which dynamic non-European economies in East Asia 
and elsewhere have also become independent and self-generating sources 
of economic growth and technological innovation.
At the same time that this process of globalization and transnational in­
tegration is taking place, economic protectionism and economic alliances 
among states and corporations are also rapidly expanding. These alliances 
are being used to influence and, in some cases, to determine, market rela­
tions and economic outcomes. As tariffs and formal trade barriers have 
come down, non-tariff barriers and informal arrangements restricting 
free trade have proliferated, a development that the French euphemisti­
cally call “organized free trade”. In the area of international finance, re­
sistance to the further integration of capital markets is surfacing and such 
barriers to market entry as Voluntary Export Restrictions and local-con­
tent rules are spreading, especially in the United States and Western Eu­
rope. Although the multinational corporation is internationalizing pro­
duction, alliances among individual states and national corporations, and 
especially among corporations themselves, have become increasingly sig­
nificant for the organization and functioning of the international political 
economy.
These contradictory developments can be given two quite different in­




























































































fessional economists, and national leaders, is that a unified world econ­
omy is rapidly coming into existence where political boundaries will be of 
decreasing significance. This position is strongly represented in the 
United States where it has influenced and continues to influence American 
foreign economic policy more generally.
However, a different interpretation, based on an analysis of certain on­
going trends, is possible. The 1988 U.S. Omnibus Trade and Competitive 
Act, the rapid overseas expansion of Japanese foreign direct investment, 
and the program of the European Community for the Completion of the 
Internal Market by 1992, support a new and rival assessment of contem­
porary developments, a viewpoint gaining proponents in the United 
States, Japan, and especially in Western Europe.
The first interpretation focuses upon the process of global integration 
and argues that in the postwar era we have witnessed and are continuing 
to observe a linear movement toward global independence of national 
economies. Inexorable economic and technological forces are believed to 
drive the economies of the world to ever higher levels of economic inte­
gration and productive efficiency. While this process of economic inte­
gration and globalization is uneven, characterized by frequent backslid­
ing, many believe that it is nevertheless inevitable. Although it may be 
momentarily held back by irrational forces and by threatened interests 
that respond to the forces of economic integration with appeals to eco­
nomic nationalism and demands for economic protectionism, in time the 
inherent logic of economic efficiency is expected to prevail as people un­
derstand that their true interests lie with a well-functioning world market, 
eliminating protectionist restraints, and moving in the direction of in­
creased globalization. As the American economist C. Fred Bergsten has 
put it, although “virtually all countries on occasion attempt to resist these 
external pressures... efforts to resist the forces of market globalization 
can succeed only partially and for limited periods of time.”9 Try as they 
might, the nations of the world cannot ultimately escape these irresistible 
forces of economic unification.
On the other hand, the second interpretation is that what is taking place 
in the international economy is a dialectical process. Both the globaliza­
tion of world markets and state intervention in domestic as well as inter­
national markets to achieve political, security, and economic goals, are 
taking place simultaneously. We are not witnessing a linear process in 
which the forces of economic integration will eventually triumph over 
economic nationalism and result in a completely open world economy. 
Instead, complementary developments of increasing globalization and in­
creasing mercantilism are interacting and reshaping the international po­
litical economy. As has happened in the past, the nation-state is adapting
9 C. Fred Bergsten. America in the World Economy; A Strategy fo r  the 1990s, 




























































































to the changing global economic, technological, and political environ­
ment.
As tariffs have come down, quantitative restrictions (QRs) on imports 
have gone up. For example, in 1980, just 5 percent of American imports 
were affected by quantitative restrictions; by 1986, 18 percent were so af­
fected. Western Europe and many developing countries have also in­
creased the usage of non-tariff restrictions on their imports.10 Important 
sectors of the Japanese economy are and no doubt will continue to be 
similarly protected. Bilateral arrangements such as the United States- 
Canadian Free Trade Agreement and the United States-Japanese mi­
crochip agreement are spreading. By one estimate, more than forty per­
cent of world trade is “managed trade” of some kind. The rules of the 
GATT, which are not applicable to important subjects such as agriculture, 
services, and direct investment, may now cover 5-7 percent the global 
economic activities.11 The international monetary system has been greatly 
weakened by the shift in the 1970s to flexible rates and the creation of the 
European Monetary System. While international macroeconomic policy 
cooperation by the G-7 governments have made impressive strides, it has 
been sporadic and its long-term success is dependent upon achievement of 
a solution to a number of political, theoretical, and technical issues.
The dual process of expanding economic interdependence and of simul­
taneous global protectionism is transforming the contemporary world 
economy and, one might add, political system. As economic and political 
leaders respond to this dual process, states and economic actors are mak­
ing changes in their policies and behaviors, changes that will accelerate in 
the future.
Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of West Germany has character­
ized these seemingly contradictory trends in a phrase reminiscent of 
MacKinder. The nations of the world, he has written, are engaged in a 
“struggle for the global product.”12 This stark and perhaps overly dra­
matic depiction of contemporary developments is based on a growing 
realization in Western Europe and elsewhere that the postwar era of eco­
nomic and political relations is rapidly coming to an end. The potential 
reintegration of the Soviet Union and other East European countries into 
the world economy, the relative decline of American economic and politi­
cal leadership, and the shifting locus of the world economy to Japan and 
the Pacific Basin are rapidly transforming the structure and the function­
ing of international relations.
10 Ibid., p. 72.
11 Ibid.





























































































At stake in this dual process of economic integration and mercantilistic 
struggle is nothing less than global economic, technological, and, by im­
plication, political leadership. Which nation or nations will be the leading 
economic power/s and which ones risk falling by the wayside as the world 
moves into the 21st century? The resolution of this issue will have major 
political and security implications.
There are two prerequisites for a nation to participate in this global 
economic competition. In the first place, it must become involved with 
and open to the world economy. The autarkic and command economies of 
the socialist bloc as well as the import substitution strategies (ISS) of 
Latin American and other Third World economies have proved to be dis­
astrous economic strategies. The demands of the less developed economies 
for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and other anti-market 
strategies have failed. The lesson, which these nations have learned the 
hard way, is that participation in the larger world economy is vital for 
economic development. In addition, important changes in the nature of 
international trade, in the economic role of multinational corporations, 
and in the significance of scientific and technological developments for 
international competitiveness point out a second lesson. Exemplified by 
the remarkable economic success of Japan and the newly industrializing 
countries (NICs) of east Asia, governments must take appropriate mea­
sures to improve, in MacKinder’s words, the “relative efficiency” of their 
economies.
Those nations or regions best equipped or adapted to take advantage of 
the remarkable changes in the world economy will succeed not only eco­
nomically but also politically. If one is to achieve economies of scale in 
production to be competitive at home and abroad or to acquire foreign 
capital and technology, then it is necessary to participate in the world 
market. Yet, these goals cannot be achieved in the contemporary world 
solely by the traditional philosophy of “leaving it up to the market”. 
Those nations or alliances of nations that will do well are the ones with 
institutions and policies enabling them not only to develop efficient do­
mestic economies, but also to exercise economic power or leverage in the 
struggle for international markets. Nations and groups of nations, there­
fore, are changing their economic strategies and attempting to position 
themselves for success or at least to avoid failure in the process of eco­
nomic globalization.
In the international political economy it is necessary to participate in 
the world market and to intervene in the market through new policy in­
struments. The most dramatic development is, of course, Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev’s concerted effort to restructure (perestroika) the 
Soviet economy and to prepare for the re-entry of this socialist economy 
into the larger world capitalist economy. His efforts and the slim chances 
for their ultimate success in this direction have captured the imagination 
of Western Europe and the United States. However, it should be noted 




























































































control have not, at least as the decade of the 1990s opened, been matched 
by similar Soviet efforts towards Asia and a reconciliation with Japan. 
Yet, it is difficult to envisage effective Soviet participation in the 21st 
century world economy without a reconciliation with the world’s third 
largest economy.
Actually, there were five restructurings of domestic and regional 
economies taking place as the new decade began. In the United States, 
Western Europe, Japan, and the more advanced developing countries as 
well as in the Soviet bloc, a process of profound economic and political 
change had begun by the end of the 1980s. Let us consider each of these 
responses to the emergent transnational world economy.
The restructuring of the American economy taking place is due in large 
part to the shift of the United States from its position as the world’s lead­
ing creditor to that of its leading debtor nation. This significant change in 
the international status of the United States could be attributed in part to 
the economic policies of the Reagan administration, in particular its huge 
budget and trade deficits. It also reflected, however, long-term or secular 
trends, for example, the relative decline in American competitiveness, a 
relatively low savings rate, and the erosion of technological leadership. 
While the United States continued to be the world’s largest and most pro­
ductive economy, it had declined significantly in relative terms.
The piecemeal responses of American political and economic leaders to 
the underlying weaknesses of the American economy have resulted in a 
fitful and, in some cases, thoughtless fashioning of new national policies 
and restructuring of the economy. Although the United states remained 
committed to multilateral approaches to global economic problems, as 
witnessed in the Uruguay GATT negotiations, unilateralism and bilateral­
ism gained significant support. The Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act 
of 1988 (which could seriously reverse the postwar American commit­
ment to liberal multilateralism, returns to the pre-war policy of bilateral­
ism and conditional reciprocity), the expansion of bilateral negotiations 
(especially with Japan and Western Europe), and the free trade agreement 
with Canada are significant new developments whose ultimate effects, for 
better or for worse, have yet to be seen. On a more positive note, Ameri­
can exports increased dramatically as the dollar was devalued, even 
though American imports continued to outpace exports. The savings rate 
improved, due in part to tax legislation and demographic changes. The 
burden of huge defense expenditures on the economy was slowly being 
reversed. Greater attention was being focussed on the sad state of Ameri­
can education and the problems of technological innovation. Inflation, 
which was a scourge in the 1970s, appeared to be under control and a 
“soft landing” of the economy seemed to be taking place as the 1990s be­
gan. Further, changes in national policies and economic arrangements ac­
celerated as the United States turned to the enormous task of repaying its 
huge international debt and re-establishing its overall competitive posi­




























































































challenges facing the American economy and society continued to be 
formidable.
Another significant development was the increasing role of Japanese 
corporations, Japanese capital, and Japanese technology in the American 
economy. The formation of corporate alliances among American and 
Japanese firms, the importation of Japanese capital to finance the federal 
budget deficit, and the fact that something like 40 percent of Japanese im­
ports into the United States were component parts for “American” prod­
ucts, illustrate this re-structuring and the development of close ties be­
tween the American and Japanese economies. The creation of this 
Nichibei economy and the increasing integration of the American and 
Japanese economies, however, raised concerns in the United States and 
complicated relations with Western Europe.13
Another major restructuring was taking place in Western Europe. The 
decision taken in 1988 to implement the Single European Act with its 
program for the Completion of the Internal Market by 1992 was an eco­
nomic and political initiative of historic significance. Integration of the 
several European national markets into a single market of 320 million 
people, and possibly larger, will obviously be very difficult to achieve 
and will require many years to complete; the shape of the internal Euro­
pean market or the definition of its policies toward the rest of the world 
will not be clear for some time. Will a Fortress Europe or an open Eu­
rope emerge? This question cannot be answered at the moment. By the 
close of the 1980s, it was quite obvious, however, that the 1992 decision 
meant a radically changed stance on the part of Western Europe.
The West Europeans appeared to be motivated by several factors. The 
first was a disenchantment with the United States and the desire for a 
greater voice in the world. The erratic nature of American economic 
policy, significant differences over foreign policy and arms control, and 
the fear of abandonment by America underlay this distancing among the 
NATO allies. A second motivation was a realization that Europe is falling 
behind the other advanced economies. West Europeans were keenly aware 
that for the first time in modem history non-European nations in Asia 
and North America were taking a commanding lead in many of the tech­
nologies of increasing importance for military power and industrial com­
petitiveness. The stimulus of a huge united internal market, it was argued, 
would propel the West Europeans into the race. Thirdly, the Europeans 
appeared to be especially worried over the perceived “threat” of Japanese 
and, to a lesser extent, east Asian competition. They were concerned that 
they will be caught between the high technology economy of Japan and 
the low wage economies of the developing world. They have begun 
preparing to meet the challenge of what they called the new international
13 This Nichibei economy is discussed in Robert Gilpin, with the assistance of Jean 





























































































division of labor being created by the third industrial revolution and the 
diffusion of existing industries to developing countries.
In a united Europe, European corporations should be able to achieve 
the economies of scale already enjoyed by American and Japanese firms. 
The merging of European corporations and the rationalization of indus­
trial production within and across national boundaries began to take place 
at an accelerating pace. West Europeans also realized that greater eco­
nomic and political unity would increase their bargaining leverage vis-à- 
vis the United States, Japan, and the Soviet Union. Their emphasis on re­
ciprocity in economic relations, their enforcement of very tough local- 
content measures, and their broad definition of “dumping” in trade 
pointed strongly in this direction. There can be little doubt also that a 
united Europe would use its increased economic and political strength to 
improve its political bargaining position with respect to the superpowers 
and its economic competitive position in what Schmidt called “the struggle 
for the world product”. Western Europe has decided to play an important 
role in the evolving international political economy.
Japan too began to restructure its domestic economy and to change its 
economic policies. Developments in Japan have been, to a considerable 
extent, a mirror image of the American situation. As Japan became the 
world’s foremost creditor nation with a high yen, its internal domestic 
and international policies had to change. With the implementation of the 
so-called Maekawa Report, Japan attempted to reduce trade friction with 
other countries and increase its own economic stability by shifting to 
greater dependence upon domestic economic growth. Of equal impor­
tance, however, Japan has used its financial and technological strength to 
create, through exports of capital and overseas production by Japanese 
multinational firms, strong links with economic partners in the Pacific 
Basin, in North America, and, if the West Europeans let them, in the uni­
fied West European market.
Although insufficiently appreciated in other countries, the economic 
restructuring and economic policy changes that have taken place in Japan 
are noteworthly. Contrary to Japanese and foreign mythology, Japan in 
the 1980s moved significantly in the direction of becoming a mass con­
sumer society, domestic demand increased as a factor in economic 
growth, important steps were taken to open its markets, especially in 
agricultural products, and its huge trade surplus was dramatically reduced 
as Japanese exports declined. Furthermore, Japan undertook important 
economic reforms and began to exercise the expanded leadership role in 
the world economy that the United States and other nations had called 
upon it to perform. In particular, Japan had made a number of important 
initiatives regarding the debt problem of developing countries.
Despite these important changes in Japanese policies, its major trading 
partners believed that Japan must go even further to open its market and 
reduce its trade surplus. While Japanese foreign investment in manufac­




























































































and lessened to some extent trade frictions, foreigners complained, as the 
1990s began, that Japan imported too few manufactured goods from 
abroad. The United States and Western Europe continued to pressure 
Japan to remove what these countries regarded as impediments to imports 
such as the Japanese distribution system and the integrated structure of 
Japanese business. Perhaps these complaints are groundless and, as two 
prominent Japanese have recently argued, Japan should simply “say no”. 
But these foreign demands will not go away and will affect how Japan , 
Western Europe, and the United States interact with one another in the 
transformed world economy.
The fourth re-structuring, if that is indeed the proper term, of the 
world economy occurred in what has been identified as the Third World. 
Generally outside the two major blocs of the First (the West) and Second 
(Soviet) worlds, these less developed countries (LDCs) had been passive 
actors on the international scene and had been regarded as an undifferen­
tiated lot. This situation began to change significantly in the 1970s with 
the rapid industrialization of the East Asian NICs and the larger LDCs in 
Asia and Latin America. Although the global debt crisis set back tem­
porarily the entry of certain LDCs such as Argentina and Brazil into the 
world economy, many developing nations began equipping themselves to 
play a much larger role in the 21st century international political 
economy.
The developing countries, especially the poorest among them, constitute 
one of the most serious challenges to the 21st century civilization. The 
weaponry of mass destruction is rapidly diffusing to these nations. They 
are acquiring nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, including the 
means to deliver them to distant targets. The combination of mass poverty 
and arsenals of mass destmction is extremely dangerous. Without a doubt, 
a growing concern over this potentially explosive situation has caused the 
United States and the Soviet Union to cooperate in dealing with the issues 
posed by these developments.
If these developing nations are left outside the 21st century world econ­
omy and have no stake in it, they will have the capability to destroy it. 
For reasons of self-interest as well as for humanitarian reasons, it is im­
perative that these countries be brought into the system.
While the main burden rests squarely on these countries themselves and 
their governments, the advanced economies can and must help. A first 
step would be to solve the global debt problem. It is nothing less than 
tragic that more has not been done in this area. Then, the flow of invest­
ment capital must be increased and markets for the industrial products of 
these countries must be kept open in advanced countries.
The fifth and most notable economic restructuring, of course, has been 
that taking place in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The dismantling 
of the rigid Stalinist legacy and the opening of these socialist economies to 




























































































economy wrought by the Bolshevick Revolution and by Stalin’s concept of 
two opposed and irreconcilable systems.
The ultimate success of Gorbachev’s economic, political, and social re­
forms in the Soviet Union will of course be primarily determined by in­
ternal economic and political forces. Although significant initiatives had 
been taken, which were once regarded as politically impossible, the cen­
tral problems of Soviet economic reform have yet to be addressed as this 
is written. For example, one basic problem is the massive amount of what 
economists call “forced savings” in the economy caused by continuing 
huge Soviet government deficits. These funds pose a powerful inflation­
ary threat and unless they are removed, price reform and a convertible 
rouble, which are preconditions for the Soviet Union rejoining the world 
economy, can not take place.
Whether or not the Soviet Union joins the world economy is not merely 
an economic issue, but also a political and security issue. As the political 
issues dividing East and West are resolved, progress toward Soviet inte­
gration in the world economy will force a redefinition of the security ties 
in both Eastern and Western alliances. At this time, (January, 1990) ma­
jor initiatives have been, taken to settle these political differences and re­
solve security issues, but several fundamental issues have yet to be re­
solved.
As I write these lines, the political and economic restructurings in East­
ern and Western Europe have become increasingly complicated and con­
fused. As the Soviet Empire crumbles, long suppressed ethnic antago­
nisms and national aspirations are stirring once again and the postwar di­
vision of Europe is rapidly disappearing. What began as two separate and 
distinct processes of economic and political change have become inti­
mately joined. With the tearing down of the Berlin Wall, the issues facing 
Eastern and Western Europe have greatly grown in importance. The uni­
fication of Germany, Western Europe, and of the European continent it­
self are now inseparable. The question of how these issues of great his­
toric moment will ultimately be settled is impossible to answer. But what­






























































































In conclusion, three basic developments accompany the transformation of 
the postwar international economy into a highly interdependent and 
transnational global economy. The first is the increased importance of 
economic regionalism. In the areas of trade, money and investment, ne­
gotiations among regional actors have increased in significance. For ex­
ample, the monetary system is decreasingly based on the dollar and in­
stead is increasingly based on the dollar, the Yen, and the European Cur­
rency Unit (ECU). The second development is the formation of corporate 
alliances. In order to be a major participant in every important national 
economy and in each of the emergent regional blocs or trading regions, 
an outside firm must have local allies. To acquire such allies it must have 
some chips to put into the game. These bargaining chips are primarily 
technology, capital, and control over market access. The third develop­
ment is the spread of economic protectionism and mercantilistic behavior. 
A shift is taking place from the multilateralism and unconditional re­
ciprocity of the postwar system established at Bretton Woods (1944) to 
the pre-war emphasis on bilateralism, conditional reciprocity, and man­
aged trade. Both globalization of the international economy and the 
spread of global mercantilism are taking place simultaneously.
International economic competition has increasingly become the pursuit 
of foreign policy by other means. This development is due in part to the 
constraint imposed upon the superpowers and other nations by nuclear 
weapons. It is also, however, a consequence of the increasing importance 
of Japan, Western Europe, and certain other countries in the world sys­
tem. Lacking the military power of the superpowers and constrained by 
World War II memories, Japan and West Germany in particular regard 
their increasing economic power as a mean to achieve their political 
goals. This enhanced role of economic competition and economic power 
in world affairs is a partial fulfillment of MacKinder’s prophecy that the 
increasing costs of war would lead to a struggle among nations for na­
tional efficiency.
The transformation of the international political economy leads to a 
number of pressing questions. What will the effects of these developments 
be on the economic welfare and political position of the major players in 
the world economy? How might be a unified western Europe and an eco­
nomically strong Japan use their newly-gained economic power? How will 
the revolution in Eastern Europe affect economic relations within the 
former Soviet bloc and the development of the 1992 initiative? Where do 
the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc fit into this process of globalization 
and economic alliances? What are the possible implications of these eco­
nomic and political changes for the economic prospects of the LDCs? If 
regional actors or trading regions are becoming more important, which 




























































































be necessary to give greater attention to the ways in which diplomacy, 
economics, and strategy interact with one another.
The transformed international political economy holds great promise. 
While it is certain that some will gain more then others in MacKinder’s 
“struggle for relative efficiency” and Schmidt’s “struggle for the global 
product”, it should be possible for all countries to progress economically. 
This possibility, however, is threatened by increasing mercantilism with 
its emphasis on bilateral arrangements, conditional reciprocity, and ex­
port surpluses; the possibility of regional trading blocs, especially in 
North America and Western Europe; and the continuing failure of the 
world economy to integrate the developing countries into the system. 
Unless these issues are resolved international economic instability and 
even economic warfare could be the result.
As noted above, action by individual governments is required to solve 
these problems. Beyond these unilateral steps certain multilateral initia­
tives are also required. The institutions such as the GATT and the IMF, 
which manage the world economy must reformed and reconstituted to 
reflect the redistribution of global economic power. The rules themselves 
that govern international economic activities will have to be changed to 
reflect the fact that the international economy has become transnational 
and highly interdependent. For example, existing rules do not cover those 
economic activities that have become of increasing importance in the 
world economy such as services and foreign investment. But most impor­
tant of all, this transnational and global economy necessitates much 
greater cooperation among the three major powers of the international 
political economy.
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